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AIDS-Related Dementia and 
Competency to Stand Trial: A 
Potential Abuse of the Forensic 
Mental Health System? 
Michael L. Perlin, Esq; and Joel A. Dvoskin, PhD 
Public health officials, hospital administrators, forensic directors, jail wardens, 
judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys must confront the issue: how should 
cases of individuals with AIDS dementia be treated when they are found to be 
permanently incompetent to stand trial? Although charges are sometimes dismissed 
in advanced cases of dementia, the more common pattern involves placement of 
the defendant in a public facility while awaiting trial. The refusal of some state 
facilities to accept these patients raises a host of legal, moral, and medical questions 
that virtually every urban state's forensic system will have to consider in the near 
future. 
On two occasions in the past two years, 
New York state trial court judges have 
dismissed felony charges against defend-
ants suffering from acquired immune 
deficiency syndrome dementia (AIDS 
dementia) with an extremely limited life 
expectancy, holding that, given the un-
controverted medical testimony, it 
~ould be purposeless to try, convict, and 
imprison the defendant. 1 Although these 
cases have received little attention, the 
decisions promise to herald a new chap-
ter in criminal procedure law: the dis-
position of cases of defendants incom-
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petent to stand trial because of AIDS 
dementia. 
Since 1981, AIDS and related disor-
ders have grown from an unknown phe-
nomenon into a tragedy of epidemic 
proporiions. 2 It is estimated that the hu-
man immunodeficiency virus (HIV)3 
has already infected more than two mil-
lion people in the United States alone, 
99 percent of whom will develop AIDS. 4 
Epidemiologists have substantiated that 
one extremely high risk group of candi-
dates for these diseases arc intravenous 
(IV) drug users. predominantly those 
whose abuse of illegal drugs and whose 
consequent adoption of a criminal life-
style make them likely candidates for 
the criminal justice system. As the Pres-
ident's Commission recently reported, 
"The future course of the HIV epidemic 
depends greatly on the effectiveness of 
our nation's ability to address IV drug 
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abuse."5 It is estimated that IV drug 
abusers constitute 25 percent of all AIDS 
cases in the United States.6 
Thus, it is not surprising that prisons 
house a disproportionate number of per-
sons with AIDS. 7 By mid-1987, there 
were over 2,000 confirmed AIDS cases 
in prisons across the country, marking 
"the most concentrated population in 
any setting. "8 In New York, for instance, 
during the years 1982 to 1987, a total of 
548 inmate deaths were attributed to 
AIDS. 9 A seroprevalence study of the 
New York state prison system tested 
blood samples of 494 consecutively ad-
mitted male inmates; 17.4 percent tested 
positive for the HIV virus, with higher 
rates found for inmates from New York 
City (20.2 %) and for Hispanic inmates 
(24.7 %). 10 Among inmates who ac-
knowledged using IV drugs, the preva-
lence rate was 44. l percent. 11 This 17.4 
percent rate would thus yield a predicted 
incidence of7,830 HIV infected inmates 
(of a population of about 45,000). 
Predictably, these problems have not 
limited themselves to the criminal jus-
tice system. 12 The public mental health 
system in New York, a system whose 
clients frequently share many demo-
graphic and socioeconomic characteris-
tics with correctional clients, has begun 
to face an emerging problem of AIDS 
infections within state psychiatric cen-
ters as well. 13 From 1983 until late 1988, 
of a total universe of between 15,000 
and 20,000 patients, l 04 patients in New 
York state psychiatric centers had con-
firmed AIDS diagnoses. 14 Most recently, 
a study has revealed that one in every 
l 7 patients institutionalized in mental 
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hospitals in New York City may be in-
fected with the AIDS virus. 14a 
It is virtually certain that problems 
shared by the criminal justice and men-
tal health systems will also be experi-
enced by that system that links the 
two-the forensic mental health sys-
tem.1 5 It is therefore not surprising that 
Central New York Psychiatric Center. 
the New York facility that provides in-
patient psychiatric services for transfers 
from the state correctional system, has 
already treated eight cases of individuals 
with AIDS, and has attributed six deaths 
to that disease. 16 In addition, a small 
number of nonsentenced forensic pa-
tients-individuals hospitalized either 
following a verdict of not guilty by rea-
son of insanity, or pursuant to a finding 
of incompetency to stand trial-have 
also developed symptoms leading to an 
AIDS diagnosis. 17 
The harsh reality that forensic units 
have traditionally been viewed as "a re-
source of last resort"-generally hidden 
from public view and interest' 8-has 
had four additional AIDS-related con-
sequences: first, they become an appeal-
ing alternative to which local jails-
traditionally overcrowded and under-
staffed 18"-can seek to transfer their 
most "difficult" to manage AIDS pa-
tients; second, such facilities simply lack 
the expertise and the resources to pro-
vide the needed care to persons with 
AIDS who are thus likely to receive in-
adequate medical treatment; third, fo-
rensic units are now forced to provide 
closely rationed psychiatric resources to 
a population whose basic needs are med-
ical care and dignified treatment. fi-
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nally, persons with AIDS in forensic 
units, often located far from urban pop-
ulation centers, are, like all other foren-
sic patients, subject to the general inter-
nal rules and regulations governing such 
units. As a result, they have lessened 
opportunities for visits and social con-
tacts with friends, families and loved 
ones, 18b a problem that is exacerbated in 
cases of individuals with terminal ill-
nesses. It is this set of problems-specif-
ically, the plight of individuals suffering 
from "AIDS dementia" who are insti-
tutionalized while awaiting trial on 
criminal charges-that is in specific 
need of serious consideration. 19 
In an effort to examine these prob-
lems, we discuss the creation of AIDS 
dementia as a diagnostic category (Part 
I), give a brief account of the procedures 
that are followed when there is a ques-
tion as to an individual's competency to 
stand trial for a criminal offense (Part 
II), and examine the way these proce-
dures "play out" in cases of AIDS de-
mentia (Part III). Finally, we will ex-
amine some of the questions raised by 
this analysis in an effort to set a focus 
on those issues to which greater atten-
tion must be paid (Part IV). 20 
I. AIDS Dementia 
Although new drugs such as Zidovu-
dine (AZT) have apparently begun to 
extend the lives of some AIDS-affiicted 
individuals, and while better health care 
has become available to some members 
of this class,21 there is a cruelly ironic 
consequence of especial significance to 
forensic patients with AIDS: some now 
live long enough to develop "AIDS de-
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mentia "22 as a direct consequence of the 
disease. 23 AIDS dementia, a progressive 
deterioration of mental function, is now 
considered the most common nervous 
system disease associated with HIV in-
fection. 24 According to Dr. Richard 
Johnson and his colleagues: 
The dementia begins with apathy, memory 
loss, and involvement of the motor system 
characterized by an increase in tone, accen-
tuated deep tendon reflexes, and clumsiness. 
This syndrome progresses to a global dementia 
with abulia, mutism, spasticity, and inconti-
nence. This has been described as a subcortical 
dementia ... with inappropriate behavior and 
problems with language and perception com-
monly seen with disorders such as Alzheimer's 
disease. 25 
It is estimated that, eventually, 60 to 
70 percent of all AIDS patients will de-
velop AIDS dementia, 26 and that the 
mean survival time from onset of de-
mentia to death is only six months (al-
though some patients remain stable for 
prolonged periods of time). 27 
Thus, if such individuals are charged 
with a criminal offense while already 
suffering from AIDS, or, if they develop 
AIDS while incarcerated in jail awaiting 
trial, it is likely that, in a significant 
number of such cases, there will be a 
judicial determination of their compe-
tency to stand trial. 28 As wi II be discussed 
in Part II, if it is determined that an 
individual is unlikely to regain this trial 
competency in the "forseeable future," 
the state is constitutionally compelled to 
either release the person or initiate cus-
tomary civil commitment proceedings 
against him. 29 It is critical that the po-
tential outcomes of such proceedings be 
considered: what procedures must be in-
voked when there is a "bona fide 
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doubt"30 as to a defendant's competency 
to stand trial ,3 1 and what are the consti-
tutional, social policy and medical ram-
ifications of such proceedings in the spe-
cific context of individuals with AIDS 
dementia?3 13 
II. Incompetency to Stand Trial 
Procedures32 
Statutory Procedures One cannot be 
tried for a criminal offense if a judge 
determines that he lacks "sufficient pres-
ent ability to consult with his lawyer 
with a reasonable degree of rational un-
derstanding-and whether he has a ra-
tional as well as factual understanding 
of the proceedings against him"; it is not 
enough for the judge simply to find that 
"the defendant is oriented to time and 
place and [has] some recollection of 
even ts [.] "33 
The test is generally seen as a cognitive 
one; among the questions asked are: 
does the defendant have the mental ca-
pacity to appreciate his presence in re-
lation to time, place, and things? Next, 
are the defendant's elementary mental 
processes such that he comprehends that 
he is in a court of justice charged with a 
criminal offense; that there is a judge on 
the bench; that there is a prosecutor 
present who will try to convict him of a 
criminal charge; that he has a lawyer 
who will undertake to defend him 
against that charge; that he will be ex-
pected to tell to the best of his ability the 
facts surrounding him at the time and 
place where the alleged violation was 
committed if he chooses to testify and 
understands the right not to testify; that 
there is or may be a jury present to pass 
352 
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upon evidence adduced as to guilt or 
innocence of such charges or, that if he 
should choose to enter into plea negoti-
ations or to plead guilty, that he com-
prehend the consequences of any guilty 
plea and that he be able to knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily waive those 
rights that are waived upon such entry 
of a guilty plea; and, that he has the 
ability to participate in an adequate pres-
entation of his defense. 34 
If a person is not competent to so 
stand trial , he can be institutionalized in 
a forensic facility until a determination 
is made as to whether he is likely to 
regain his competence to stand trial in 
the "foreseeable future. "35 If regaining 
competency is not likely in the foresee-
able future, then, according to the U.S. 
Supreme Court's 1972 decision of Jack-
son v. Indiana, the state is constitution-
ally required to either release that person 
or institute the customary civil commit-
ment proceeding that would be required 
to commit any other citizen. Likewise, 
if it is determined that the defendant 
"probably soon will be able to stand trial, 
his continued commitment must be jus-
tified by progress toward that goal. "36 
In New York State, for instance, 37 
once the court is satisfied that the person 
is not competent to stand trial, it must 
issue a final or temporary order of ob-
servation committing the individual to 
the custody of the state commissioner of 
mental health or retardation for care and 
treatment in an appropriate institution 
for a period not to exceed ninety days 
from the date of the order. 38 
After a judgment of incompetency, 
the need for continued hospitalization is 
Bull Am Acad Psychiatry Law, Vol. 18, No. 4, 1990 
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subject to ongoing judicial review, a pro-
cedure analogous to ci vii commitment. 39 
If, at the conclusion of the hearing,40 the 
court is satisfied that the defendant is 
competent to stand trial , the criminal 
action against the defendant must pro-
ceed. On the other hand, if the court is 
satisfied that the defendant continues to 
be incompetent to stand trial, or if no 
demand for a hearing is made, the court 
must adjudicate him an incapacitated 
person and must issue an order of reten-
tion authorizing continued custody of 
the defendant by the commissioner for 
a period not to exceed one year.41 Once 
a defendant has been committed to the 
custody of the commissioner, he must 
be placed in an appropriate institution 
operated by the department of mental 
health or retardation.42 
Implications of AIDS Dementia 
Given the level of deterioration of 
functioning in individuals with AIDS 
dementia,43 and the likelihood that such 
persons develop characteristics similar 
to patients suffering from such global 
subcortical disorders as Alzheimer's dis-
ease,44 it is not surprising to suggest that 
most of this population would fit 
squarely within the language of the 
Jackson decision as unable to stand trial 
"within the foreseeable future. "45 At that 
point, the focus shifts to the next levels 
of inquiry: how are the underlying cases 
to be disposed of, and, simply, what 
happens to the defendant? 
To the lay public, it might seem alto-
gether appropriate that individuals with 
AIDS dementia remain incarcerated-
for life-in forensic facilities, since such 
individuals(!) are afflicted with what is 
Bull Am Acad Psychiatry Law, Vol. 18, No. 4, 1990 
generally viewed as a pern1c1ous and 
highly communicable physiological dis-
ease, that has apparent psychological 
side effects, and (2) have been charged 
with the commission of serious crime. 
This apparently commonsensical ap-
proach, however, is deeply flawed. 46 
First, the treatment goals of forensic pa-
tients are determined primarily by their 
legal status. For patients found incom-
petent to stand trial, the predominant 
goal of treatment is to restore the per-
son 's capacity to stand trial , and not to 
provide long-term psychiatric care.47 
One cannot simply be "banished" to 
such an institution because society is 
unable to conceptualize a better place-
ment. Any decision as to long-term 
placement must be based on factors be-
yond the simple fact that the individual 
has been charged with some level of 
criminal offense.48 Second, the United 
States Supreme Court made crystal-clear 
17 years ago in Jackson that the federal 
constitution forbids holding a pretrial 
detainee "more than the reasonable 
period of time necessary to determine 
whether there is a substantial probability 
that he will attain that capacity [i.e. , 
competence to stand trial] in the fore-
seeable future. "49 Third , these individ-
uals have not been convicted of any 
criminal offense,50 and thus are consti-
tutionally not subject to punishment.5' 
Fourth, forensic units are generally not 
staffed with professionals suitably 
trained in the medical treatment of neu-
rological disorders such as AlDS demen-
tia. Such units are not set up to serve as 
long-term facilities for nonambulatory 
patients, a category that encompasses 
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many individuals with AIDS dementia.52 
All participants in the system-public 
health officials, hospital administrators, 
forensic directors, jail wardens, judges, 
prosecutors, and defense attorneys-
m ust thus step back and confront this 
issue: how should cases of individuals 
with AIDS dementia be treated when 
they are found to be permanently in-
competent to stand trial?53 
Ill. Recent New York 
Developments 
As discussed above, state criminal trial 
court judges have recently dismissed 
criminal charges in felony cases involv-
ing defendants with AIDS dementia " in 
an advanced stage, with extremely lim-
ited life expectancies, and who were 'not 
likely to recover. "'54 In People v. Quinn, 
the judge heard uncontroverted testi-
mony from the defendant's supervising 
physician at a private hospital that the 
nonambulatory, wheelchair-bound de-
fendant "could not withstand a trial of 
any duration. "55 The court concluded 
that Quinn-who had been charged with 
attempted murder, assault, and weapons 
possession-was in an "extremely inca-
pacitated state of health" with an "ex-
tremely bleak" prognosis. 56 
After balancing the defendant's inter-
ests with those of the state, the court 
examined the statutory criteria (dis-
cussed in Part II, above) and ordered the 
charges dismissed. Although the defend-
ant had been indicted for a "very serious 
crime" and the state alleged that it had 
"ample evidence of his guilt," in view of 
the defendant's "mentally impaired con-
dition " and of his "progressive physical 
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deterioration ,'' it concluded that the 
likelihood of the defendant's ability to 
stand trial was "at best remote. "57 
Even if he were tried and convicted, 
the court continued, there would be no 
penological purpose in imposing a 
prison sentence "when he has been sen-
tenced to a much harsher fate and in-
deed almost certain death from the 
AIDS disease. "58 The decision to dismiss 
the indictment "should not impact upon 
the confidence of the public in the crim-
inal justice system," the court under-
scored, as the defendant, in his "dire 
circumstances" could not be considered 
a community threat "since it is most 
unlikely that he will ever walk the streets 
again. "59 
In People v. Ortiz , the court ordered 
weapons and narcotics charges dis-
missed under a separate section of the 
state criminal procedure act that allows 
for such an action when there is "any 
compelling reason exist[ing] to demon-
strate that conviction or prosecution of 
a defendant would result in an injus-
tice. " 60 It concluded with a (rare for a 
judicial opinion) epigram from Longfel-
low: "Mercy more becomes a magistrate 
than the vindictive wrath which men call 
justice. "6 1 
The court's disposition of these cases 
appear totally consistent with both the 
constitutional framework set out in 
Jackson and the procedural scheme con-
tained in the state statute (although Or-
tiz was ultimately decided on an "inter-
ests of justice" theory rather than on 
substantive competency law). It must be 
noted, however, that Quinn arose in the 
context of a private hospital patient, and 
Bull Am Acad Psychiatry Law, Vol. 18, No. 4, 1990 
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that Ortiz's sister promised the court 
that she would provide nursing care for 
her brother (whose life expectancy was 
less than 90 days). 62 What additional 
issues are raised in the more common 
fact pattern, where the defendant is in a 
public facility awaiting trial? 
In the past several months, commit-
ment has been sought by state trial 
courts to the New York State Office of 
Mental Health (OMH) after findings of 
incompetence to stand trial, 63 the de-
fendants' incompetence stemming pri-
marily from AIDS dementia. 64 Each of 
the three received intensive medical care 
while in jail before his transfer,65 and at 
least one had received OMH services 
prior to the onset of AIDS dementia. 66 
In each case, OMH resisted acceptance 
of the patient; and , in the one case where 
transfer was actually effectuated (and the 
one which in which the patient is still 
living), it was done only after protracted 
negotiations as a result of which the 
sending city jail agreed to provide the 
state with the needed requisite medical 
backup services.67 In short, no state fa-
cility in New York was willing to ac-
cept-without more-forensic referrals 
of patients with AIDS who were also 
found incompetent to stand trial. 68 
IV. Unanswered Questions 
This refusal raises a plethora of legal 
and related humanitarian issues.69 First, 
was the incompetency mechanism prop-
erly invoked in these cases?70 Under 
Jackson and New York's criminal pro-
cedure law, due process requires that the 
nature and duration of commitment 
bear "some reasonable relation to the 
Bull Am Acad Psychiatry Law, Vol. 18, No. 4, 1990 
purpose for which the individual is com-
mitted. " 7 1 In each of the three cases in 
question , clinical opinion was unani-
mous: the defendants were permanently 
and terminally incompetent, and there 
was thus no "reasonable likelihood" of 
restoration in the "foreseeable future" ; 
under these circumstances, is a post-
incompetency commitment ever 
proper?72 Second, if it were not proper, 
to what sort of facility should the de-
fendants be committed?73 Third, do hos-
pitals-forensic or otherwise-have a 
right to refuse such patients? If they do 
not, what sanctions, if any, are available? 
Fourth, what will happen if the de-
fendant remains committed-awaiting 
trial-for a period of time longer than 
the maximum for which he could be 
sentenced had he been convicted of the 
underlying crime?74 Fifth, no matter 
where the defendant is, does he have a 
right to medical care?75 If so, does that 
contemplate expensive, experimental 
treatments such as AZT, treatments that 
may not yet be available to the general 
community? Sixth, ~[the Jackson case is 
invoked, and the defendant transferred 
to a civil hospital, of what applicability 
are such doctrines as the right to treat-
ment, 76 the right to refuse treatment, 77 
the right to least restrictive alternative,78 
or, conversely, the "right to die"?79 Al-
though these cases have generally been 
litigated in New York and elsewhere on 
behalf of individuals suffering from 
mental illness80 or those who are men-
tally retarded,8 1 there appear to be no 
principled reasons why the doctrines de-
veloped in such cases should not be sim-
ilarly applicable to persons with AIDS 
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dementia. Seventh, what impact will the 
presence of such patients-largely un-
treatable through traditional psychiatric 
methods-have on the treatment-re-
sponsiveness of other "regular" psychi-
atric patients on the wards in question? 
Eighth, how will the intractable finan-
cial issues be sorted out? Is Medicaid 
funding available in such cases?82 If it is, 
what impact does forensic placement 
have on the possibility of such funding? 
Is it permissible for these factors to influ-
ence the disposition of the case? Ninth, 
is AIDS dementia, simply, "different"83 
(because of the additional layers of 
stigma and the special problems associ-
ated with contagion)?84 If so, and if med-
ical care is thus seen as a more pressing 
need than psychiatric care (if such "psy-
chiatric care" as it is commonly thought 
of is even meaningfully possible), how 
will the quality of that care be assessed? 
Then, what are the goals of care: to 
sustain life, to extend life, to allow for 
death-with-dignity,85 to protect the 
safety of others, to provide comfort? 
Finally, what will happen in the 
case-unlike Quinn or Ortiz-where ex-
pert testimony is not as clear or as un-
opposed? Courts are increasingly more 
loath to settle so-called "battles of the 
experts," especially where the expert tes-
timony deals with psychiatric diagnosis 
and/or predictions of future dangerous-
ness.86 How will they construe expert 
testimony in an area as volatile as the 
disposition of alleged criminal offenders 
with AIDS? 
It is clear that the criminal justice 
system is finally becoming aware of the 
scope of the problem it faces. Recently, 
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a New York state supreme courtjustice 
has called on the state legislature to 
amend the Criminal Procedure Act to 
attempt to deal with the issues under 
discussion here.87 In dismissing reckless 
endangerment against a criminal de-
fendant (in a case characterized by the 
judge as the product of a "stormy gay 
relationship [with] apparent sado-mas-
ochistic overtones"), Justice William D. 
Friedmann placed the case in a social 
context: 
Recent criminal justice system experience with 
AIDS infected persons should inspire consid-
erable procedural and substantive changes in 
the years to come. As AIDS-infected people 
impact all aspects of the system, our courts 
and local correctional authorities must con-
tend with these persons who are charged with 
crime and who are awaiting trial and/ or sen-
tence with little or no prospect of being able 
to participate in these procedures.ss 
The problems raised here are over-
whelming ones, and may appear, at first 
blush, to be intractable and insurmount-
able. Whereas the goals of mental health 
care have been fairly clearly articulated 
in both statute and case law,89 there has 
been no serious consideration-either 
episodic or broad-based-as to how such 
issues "play out" in the AIDS dementia 
context. Yet, they are problems with 
which virtually every urban state's foren-
sic system will have to deal in the all-
too-near future. Our national AIDS pol-
icy has for too long been characterized 
by a "head in the sand" approach,90 and 
the catastrophic results of that policy are 
now being played out. We cannot allow 
such an attitude of "willful blindness"91 
to color our treatment of individuals 
who face desolation and, perhaps, inev-
Bull Am Acad Psychiatry Law, Vol. 18, No. 4, 1990 
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itable death as unwanted participants in 
the criminal justice system. 
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